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1 Introduction
The Internet and electronic publishing have brought fundamental changes into the mar-
ket for academic journals. On the one hand, it allowed large publishers to practice Big
Deal1 pricing by bundling a large collection of journals. On the other hand, it induced
libraries to form consortia, whereby libraries of a given geographical area join forces in
order to share acquisition of electronic academic journals licensed through the Big Deal.
Virtually every country or region has built or has the possibility of building a national
or regional library consortium. North American examples include OhioLINK, the Tri-
angle Research Libraries Network of North Carolina (TRLN), the Greater Western Li-
brary Alliance (GWLA), the Colorado Alliance of Research Libraries (CARL) and the
Ontario Council of University Libraries (OCUL). Some well-known European groups in-
clude HEAL-LINK (Greek academic libraries including the National Library) and CBUC
(academic libraries of Catalonia in Spain).2
In this paper, we aim to identify the strategies that make a library consortium suc-
cessful from a long term point of view as suggested by Thomas A. Peters (2001a), director
of Center for Library Initiatives,
One challenge for academic library consortia is to shift gears and engage in more
deliberate strategic planning with an eye to positive long-terms outcomes.
There are two kinds of "conventional wisdom" regarding library consortia. First,
it is frequently argued that because of economies of scale, the more participants there
are, the better the deal is (Okerson, 2015). Second, it has also been suggested that
libraries organize themselves into groups of homogenous institutions with similar missions
(Davis, 2002). In this paper, we focus on how a consortium a¤ects competition among
publishers and obtain results that challenge the conventional wisdom. Namely, we show
that libraries can gain or lose from building a consortium and that they are more likely to
gain (respectively, to lose) when the consortium is formed by libraries of diverse preferences
(respectively, similar preferences).
One natural argument in favor of the economies of scale is that the buying power
of a consortium increases with the number of the participants. The buying power can
increase because the consortium improves either the direct bargaining power or the outside
option.3 Furthermore, if competing researchers in the same eld bargained together and
all faced the same inconvenience together if the bargaining with a publisher broke down,
1Big Deal is dened as any online aggregation of e-content that a publisher, aggregator, or vendor
o¤ers for sale or lease at prices and/or terms that substantially encourage acquisition of the entire corpus
(Peters, 2001b).
2Other examples include: CAUL CEIRC (Australia), ANSF (Brazil), CALIS (China), MALMAD
(Israel), INFER (Italy), KESLI (Korea).
3For instance, the outside option of a consortium can increase with the number of its members if there
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this would improve the threat point because the scholars would not be su¤ering too much
of a relative disadvantage. This logic would provide a rationale for building a consortium
with homogenous libraries.4 However, Dewatripont et al. (2006) provide reasons for which
libraries cannot improve their bargaining power much by building a consortium.5
Another argument in favor of the conventional wisdom is based on quantity discounts.
If publishers propose non-linear tari¤s as functions of usage, they are likely to provide
quantity discounts. Then, it might be desirable to build a consortium with a large number
of libraries with similar preferences. This is especially true for printed materials which
are owned by the libraries on a permanent basis once they are purchased. However, the
reasoning fails to apply to electronic academic journals, which are licensed on an annual
basis. As publishersability to commit to future prices is limited, the gain from quantity
discounts may last only for the short run.6
In this paper, we focus on one important aspect a¤ecting the protability of a con-
sortium which has been neglected up to now. Precisely, we take a long-term view in the
sense that publishers can change their prices after a consortium is formed and focus on
how a consortium a¤ects price competition among publishers. For this purpose, we build
on the framework of our previous papers (Jeon and Menicucci, 2006 and 2011) where
each (for-prot) publisher competes by o¤ering its bundle of journals at a personalized
price7 to each di¤erent library (or a consortium) under complete information8 about the
librarys preferences and budget.9 We assume that all the budgets of the member libraries
are pooled and that the consortium maximizes the joint payo¤ of all member libraries. In
this setting, we study the conditions under which building a consortium is benecial.
Since we consider that publishers make price o¤ers before libraries make purchase de-
cisions and that the outside option of each library (and a consortium) is normalized at
is an economy of scale in the benet from sharing non-overlapping resources.
4We are grateful to a referee for providing us with this argument.
5First, they argue that "since researchers do not see the various publishers as good substitutes and need
access to all journals, consortia only introduce a relatively weak buyer power(p.8)." Second, according
to them, this buyer concentrationremains however modest in comparison with publisher concentration:
the largest library consortium represents 2 or 3% of global journal purchases, while the largest publisher
represents more than 20% of journal sales (p.8).
6For instance, Dewatripont et al. (2006) argue that we may fear that consortia in fact strengthen
the possibility for publishers to charge a high price for their electronic collection (p.52).
7Actually, publishersprice o¤ers are tailored directly to individual characteristics of libraries or con-
sortia. According to Edlin and Rubinfeld (2004), Here, the price that a buyer is quoted depends upon
the buyers observable characteristics.
8It is now easy to estimate the value of a given journal to a library since the publisher and the library
can observe the number of downloads of the journal (Gatten and Sanville, 2004 and Scigliano 2010).
According to Derk Haank (2001), CEO of Elsevier Science, What we are basically doing is to say that
you pay depending on how useful the publication is for you - estimated by how often you use it.
9Jeon and Menicucci (2006) show that bundling is a dominant strategy in this setting.
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zero, our model does not capture any gain in buyer power. This implies that in our model,
there is no gain from building a consortium in the case of a monopolist publisher. There-
fore, we essentially focus on how a consortium a¤ects the competition among publishers,
which we think provides a long-term perspective since only competition can restrain the
amount of surplus that each publisher can extract in the long run. We nd that building a
consortium increases the aggregate payo¤ of the member libraries only if their preferences
are diverse enough to create a level-playing eld among di¤erent individually-preferred
publishers.
Since we assume that the value that a library obtains from a publishers bundle is
independent from the value that it obtains from anothers bundle, competition among
publishers is generated by the librarys budget constraint.10 Consider competition be-
tween two bundles in the market of a given library. As the asymmetry between the two
bundlesvalues increases above the librarys budget, the library ends up consuming only
its preferred bundle since there is no budget left for the other bundle. Combining libraries
with negatively correlated values to form a consortium intensies the competition between
the two publishers for scarce combined budgets because the asymmetry between the two
bundlesvalues is reduced, which increases the chance for the consortium to consume both
bundles.
In order to provide a further intuition, consider the extreme case of perfectly negative
correlation. Suppose that Library 1 (2) likes bundle A (B) so much that Library 1
(2) consumes only bundle A (B) in the absence of the consortium. Then, building a
consortium creates a level-playing eld between the two publishers such that no publisher
monopolizes the market for the consortium and the consortium consumes both bundles.
Conversely, in the case of two identical libraries (i.e., perfectly positive correlation), the
consortium has no impact on the librariespayo¤s nor on the publisherspayo¤s, since each
library continues to consume the same bundles and bear the same expenses, as without the
consortium. Last, consider the intermediate case in which Library 1 consumes only bundle
A while Library 2 consumes both bundles A and B without the consortium. Then, the
consortium can either increase or decrease the aggregate payo¤ of the libraries depending
on the size of its budget. If the budget is small enough, publisher A can export its
residual market power from Library 1 to Library 2 and monopolize the entire market of
the consortium. This logic is similar to the one that multimarket contact allows rms
to export residual collusive power from one market to another (Bernheim and Whinston,
1990).
In Section 5, we show that our main insight is robust to making the budget of each
library endogenous. We consider that a funding agency decides whether or not to form
10In Section 7.1, we consider the case in which two bundles of journals can be either complements or
substitutes and show that the main result is robust to this extension.
3
a consortium and the budget of the consortium or each individual library. Then, our
prediction for the case of positive correlation becomes sharper, as two libraries never gain
from forming a consortium no matter what the degree of positive correlation. In the case of
negative correlation, the result from the case of endogenous budget is remarkably similar
to that from the case of exogenous budget: in both scenarios, the range of parameters for
which building a consortium is benecial increases with the absolute degree of correlation.
In Section 6, we consider two di¤erent scenarios in which each publisher can commit
to a price that it will charge to the consortium before a funding agency decides whether
or not to form it. In the rst scenario, each publisher o¤ers its price for the consortium
while assuming that if the consortium is not formed, the publishers will compete in the
market of each individual library. The latter determines a reservation utility for each
library, which constrains the price that each publisher can charge to the consortium. We
nd that there exists an equilibrium in which each library at least weakly gains from
building a consortium for all parameter values. This commitment case may correspond
to a short-term situation. However, in the long run, publishers may not be constrained
any more by such reservation utility. For this purpose, we consider a second scenario in
which publishers can provide a menu of prices for each library and for the consortium
before the funding agency decides to form a consortium. We nd that the outcome of
this menu pricing game is the same as that of the game in which publishers compete
after the consortium is formed. As the publishers can threaten to charge high prices if
the consortium is not formed, they are not constrained by the possibility for the libraries
to make individual purchases. Therefore, a short-term gain may be associated with a
long-term loss, generating a consortium trap.
Even through we focused on the market for academic journals, our results can be
applied to other markets as long as competition among sellers is generated by buyers
budget constraints. For instance, in the market for drugs or vaccines, hospitals often form
a group for joint purchase and pharmaceutical rms o¤er personalized non-linear tari¤s.
More precisely, in the French antitrust case against GlaxoSmithKline France (Autorité
de Concurrence, 2007), GlaxoSmithKline o¤ered di¤erent non-linear prices to di¤erent
hospitals or groups of hospitals. French competition authority condemned the rms
practice of bundling two di¤erent drugs by arguing that because of the budget constraint
of hospitals, bundling a monopoly drug with another can allow the rm to leverage the
monopoly power from the former to the latter even if the two drugs are very di¤erent.
More broadly, our paper is relevant to the literature on internal capital markets (Ce-
stone and Fumagalli, 2005, Fluck and Lynch, 1999, Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994,
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000, Stein, 1997). The literature studies pros and cons of com-
bining several projects under one conglomerate instead of having them as stand-alone
rms. It focuses on nancing investment projects in the presence of agency problems and
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compares centralized management of credit by a headquarters with decentralized man-
agement. Although we focus on a di¤erent aspect of input purchase, our theory o¤ers an
insight relevant to the literature as we analyze benets and costs of central allocation of
budget with respect to decentralized allocation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 reviews the related literature. Section
2 presents our model. Section 3 obtains a general result in the case of a consortium of
n libraries. Section 4 provides more precise results focusing on correlation of preferences
by considering a consortium of two libraries. Section 5 studies the case of endogenous
budget. Section 6 studies commitment to consortium pricing. In Section 7, we briey
discuss two extensions that show the robustness of our results: Section 7.1 discusses when
two bundles are substitutes or complements and Section 7.2 discusses when there are
three competing publishers. The detailed analysis of the two extensions is provided in
Appendix B of Supporting Information. Section 8 provides the conclusion.
1.1 Literature review
Our paper is related to the literature on buyer group which studies when buyers gain
from forming a buyer group, more specically to the papers that analyze the question in
a framework of competing sellers: Inderst and Sha¤er (2007), Marvel and Yang (2008),
Dana (2012), Chen and Li (2013). Among those paper, our paper is more closely related to
Inderst and Sha¤er (2007) and Dana (2012) since they assume that sellers have complete
information on buyerspreferences and hence can o¤er personalized tari¤s, regardless of
whether or not buyers form a group. Although the two papers di¤er in the way they
generalize their results,11 the main insight can be obtained by considering a two-seller-
two-buyer setting in which each buyer buys one unit from only one of the two sellers.
They assume that the buyer group makes exclusive purchase commitment and that sellers
make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. In this setup, a buyer group never decreases the aggregate
payo¤ of its members: it strictly increases the aggregate payo¤ unless they have identical
preferences. Our paper di¤ers from Inderst and Sha¤er (2007) and Dana (2012) in two
important assumptions: sellers compete for a limited budget and neither individual buyer
nor the buyer group makes exclusive purchase commitment. This leads to a di¤erent
conclusion that a buyer group can either increase or reduce the aggregate payo¤ of the
buyers.
Our companion paper (Jeon and Menicucci, 2014) also studies the question of how a
11Inderst and Sha¤er (2007) consider competition in non-linear tari¤ between two sellers and extend
their result to a bargaining setup. They also make each sellers choice of product characteristics endoge-
nous. Dana (2012) considers n sellers, a continuum of buyers, and allows di¤erent buyer groups to get
formed. He proves that the grand coalition is a coalition-proof subgame perfect equilibrium when there
are two sellers.
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buyer group a¤ects the aggregate payo¤ when sellers compete. As in the current paper,
buyers do not commit to exclusive purchase. However, there are some important di¤er-
ences: buyers have no budget constraint and sellers sell strict substitutes and compete by
o¤ering personalized non-linear tari¤s. In that paper, we focus on the equilibrium which
is Pareto-dominant in terms of the sellerspayo¤s and show that buyer group strictly
reduces the aggregate payo¤ of the buyers if sellerscosts are convex but does not a¤ect
it if sellerscosts are linear or concave.
Our current paper builds on the theoretical literature on the market for academic
journals which studies issues raised by the move to electronic publishing.12 The literature
has studied bundling and/or price discrimination (McCabe, 2004, Jeon and Menicucci,
2006, Armstrong 2010), interoperability (Jeon and Menicucci, 2011), and open access
journals (McCabe and Snyder, 2007, Jeon and Rochet, 2010, Armstrong 2014). We
contribute to the literature by studying the issue of library consortia.
Although we consider a common agency under complete information (Bernheim and
Whinston, 1986, 1998, Jeon and Menicucci, 2012), the well-known result that competition
among sellers achieves the outcome that maximizes the joint payo¤ of all sellers and the
buyer fails to hold in our setting because of the budget constraint. In contrast, Jeon and
Menicucci (2012) show that the result holds if the common agency faces a slot constraint
instead of a budget constraint.
2 A simple model of the market for academic jour-
nals
As we mentioned in the introduction, we build on the model of our previous papers (Jeon
and Menicucci, 2006 and 2011), and accordingly assume that publishers have complete
information about the value that a library (or a consortium of libraries) attaches to each
bundle of journals and about the librarys budget (or the consortiums budget), and o¤er
personalized prices based on that information.13
There are two (for-prot) publishers, A and B, and n  2 libraries; in Section 7.2,
we extend the model to three publishers. We distinguish a mandatory consortium from a
voluntary consortium. In the case of a mandatory consortium, a funding agency decides
whether the purchase of the publishersjournals will be done in a decentralized manner
(through each library) or in a centralized manner (through a library consortium). Hence,
12See Bergstrom (2001) and Dewatripont et al. (2006) for an introduction.
13In reality, some degree of asymmetric information between publishers and libraries may be present (as
mentioned by one referee), but we believe that the benet of additional insights from explicitly modelling
asymmetric information is lower than the cost of making the model more complex and less tractable.
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once it decides to form a consortium, each library is participation, for i = 1; :::; n, is
mandatory. In contrast, in the case of a voluntary consortium, the libraries collectively
decide whether to form a consortium or not and therefore the participation is voluntary. In
this case, the consortiums budget is determined by the contribution of each participating
library.14 We mainly focus on the mandatory consortium and discuss how our analysis
can be applied to the voluntary consortium.
Given that each publisher o¤ers personalized prices, without loss of generality, we
assume that each publisher o¤ers a pure bundle of all its journals to each library or
the consortium.15 Hence, publisher j (= A;B) o¤ers bundle j. Let U ij(> 0) denote the
monetary utility that library i (= 1; :::; n) obtains from consuming bundle j. It is assumed
to be independent of whether the library also consumes bundle k(6= j) with k = A;B;
in Section 7.1, we consider the case in which the bundles are substitutes or complements
and show the robustness of the results. Let M i(> 0) denote the budget of library i. In
the baseline model, the budget of each library is exogenously given whereas in Section 5,
the budget of each library is endogenously determined. The payo¤ of a library is equal
to the utility it obtains from the bundles of journals it buys plus the budget left after
the purchase. The librarys utility from the remaining budget can be interpreted as the
utility from using it to purchase monographs, database and journals of minor publishers.
Let C represent the consortium of the n libraries. As the consortium is assumed to
maximize the sum of all member librariespayo¤s, the utility it obtains from consuming
bundle j is given by:
UCj =
nX
i=1
U ij :
In the baseline model, we compare the decentralized purchase to the centralized one for
a given aggregate budget. Therefore, the budget of the consortium is given by:
MC =
nX
i=1
M i:
The payo¤ of the consortium is equal to the utility it obtains from the bundles it buys
plus the budget left after the purchase.
Let P ij (> 0) represent the price that publisher j (= A;B) charges to library i (=
1; :::; n; C) for bundle j. We assume that the xed cost of producing the rst copy of
14For instance, according to Sloan (2000), with the Illinois Digital Academic Library (IDAL), data-
bases are supported centrally with funds from the Illinois Board of Higher Education and the decision
making is centralized. In contrast, with Illinois Bibliographic Information Service (IBIS) of Illinois Li-
brary Computer System Organization (ILCSO), database are licensed with local library funds and much
decision-making rests in the hands of local libraries.
15Arguing as in the proof of Proposition 2(i) in Jeon and Menicucci (2006), we can prove that, for each
publisher, pure bundling of its journals weakly dominates any alternative to pure bundling.
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bundle j has already been incurred and that the marginal cost of distributing a journal is
zero. Therefore, publisher js prot is equal to publisher js revenue, and social welfare
is maximized when all libraries consume both bundles.
We consider a game with the following timing:
 Stage 0: The funding agency decides whether to form a consortium or not.
 Stage 1: Each publisher j simultaneously chooses P ij > 0 for i = 1; :::; n (respectively,
PCj > 0) if there is no consortium (respectively, if the consortium is formed).
 Stage 2: Each library (or the consortium) decides the bundle(s) to buy.
Notice that at stage 1, we require P ij > 0, and exclude P
i
j = 0, because in some cases
publisher j earns a librarys entire budget, and thus there is no budget left for publisher
k(6= j). Then our assumption of positive prices rules out the possibility that publisher
k gives away bundle k for free. Thus, we suppose that each publisher prefers not selling
its bundle to selling it at zero price, which can be justied if there is a small cost of
contracting with a library.
Our analysis can be applied to voluntary consortium as long as the participating
libraries can commit not to dissolve the consortium at later stages after the consortium
formation at stage 0.
Consider competition in the market for a given library i (= 1; :::; n; C). We eliminate
the superscript i and, without loss of generality, assume UA  UB. Then, from our
previous papers, we have16
Lemma 1 (Jeon and Menicucci, 2006 and 2011) Consider competition between two pub-
lishers in the market for a given library:
(i) if M  UA   UB, then publisher A charges PA = M , publisher B charges an
arbitrary PB > 0, and the library buys only bundle A;
(ii) if UA   UB < M < UA + UB, then the publishers charge PA = 12(M + UA   UB),
PB =
1
2
(M + UB   UA), and the library buys both bundles;
(iii) if UA + UB  M , then the publishers charge PA = UA, PB = UB, and the library
buys both bundles.
16In fact, in Jeon and Menicucci (2006, 2011), we consider more than two publishers and assume
that publishers play a three-stage game in which rst each publisher simultaneously decides whether to
be active or not, and then only active publishers compete in prices (libraries cannot buy from inactive
publishers). In Section 7.2, where we consider three publishers, we adopt this three-stage game. However,
when there are only two publishers, this game yields the same outcome that is described by Lemma 1 for
our current game.
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In particular, when M  UA   UB, only publisher A succeeds in selling its bundle
because even when A charges PA = M (the highest feasible price), the librarys payo¤
from buying only bundle A, UA, is larger than the payo¤ from buying only bundle B,
UB+M  PB, for any PB > 0. On the other hand, ifM  UA UB, then the library buys
both bundles and it is simple to see that PA = UA, PB = UB when M  UA +UB. When
instead UA   UB < M < UA + UB, prices are determined by the indi¤erence condition
UA   PA = UB   PB; (1)
and by the binding budget constraint
PA + PB =M; (2)
where (1) means that the library is indi¤erent between purchasing only bundle A and
purchasing only bundle B. Thus no publisher j has an incentive to increase its price
above Pj since then the library can not a¤ord to buy both bundles (because of the binding
budget constraint) and would buy only the bundle of the rival publisher.
Lemma 1 applies both to each library without a consortium and to the consortium. In
the next sections, we compare the outcome without a consortium and the outcome with
a consortium.
3 Consortium of n libraries for exogenous budget
In this section, we consider the model of n libraries introduced in Section 2. We assume
Assumption 1: M i < U iA + U
i
B for i = 1; :::; n.
If Assumption 1 is not satised for library i, there is no competition between the two
publishers in the market for library i since each publisher extracts the full surplus. Hence,
this assumption implies that the two publishers compete because of the budget constraint
in the market for each given library i = 1; :::; n. As a consequence, every library i ends up
spending its whole budget to buy one bundle or both.17 Assumption 1 also implies that
MC < UCA + U
C
B , and thus the consortium spends its whole budget to buy one bundle or
both. Therefore, in order to determine the e¤ects of building a consortium on libraries
payo¤s, we only need to study how librariesconsumption of bundles is a¤ected.
Without loss of generality, we assume C  UCA   UCB  0 and that there exists
an n0 between 1 and n such that i  U iA   U iB  0 for i = 1; :::; n0 and i < 0 for
i = n0 + 1; :::; n. Libraries 1; :::; n0 are called type A libraries (there is a non-empty set of
type A libraries since UCA  UCB ); the other libraries (if any) are called type B libraries.
17In Section 5, in which we make the budget endogenous, Assumption 1 is always satised
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Lemma 1 makes clear that the only characteristics of library i which matter are i
and M i. Without a consortium, library i of type j buys only bundle j if M i  jij,
buys both if M i > jij, for j = A;B. Likewise, the consortium buys only bundle A if
MC  C (recall that C  0), buys both if MC > C . These remarks deliver the
following results.
Proposition 1 (exogenous budget) Suppose Assumption 1 and (without loss of generality)
C  UCA   UCB  0. Consider the consortium of n ( 2) libraries.
(i) When C < MC, the consortium buys both bundles and hence the payo¤ of each
library is weakly larger than without the consortium. The consortium strictly increases
the aggregate payo¤ of the libraries unless each library buys both bundles without the
consortium.
(ii) When MC  C, the consortium buys only bundle A and hence the payo¤ of each
library is weakly smaller than without the consortium. The consortium strictly reduces
the aggregate payo¤ of the libraries unless each library buys only bundle A without the
consortium.
Proof. It is omitted since it is straightforward from Lemma 1.
It is simple to see why this proposition is true. Without the consortium, each library of
type j either buys only bundle j or both. When the consortium is formed andMC  C ,
each library consumes only bundle A and therefore (i) a type B library is worse o¤; (ii) a
type A library is una¤ected if it buys only bundle A without the consortium and is worse
o¤ otherwise. On the other hand, when the consortium buys both bundles, each library
enjoys maximal consumption and this strictly increases the payo¤ of each library which
does not buy both bundles without the consortium.
Proposition 1 implies that a key issue is whether or not the inequalityC < MC holds.
This condition is most easily satised when the preferences of libraries over journals are
quite heterogenous, that is within the consortium the intensity of the preferences of type
A libraries for bundle A over bundle B are more or less counterbalanced by that of type
B libraries for bundle B over bundle A. The ideal case is such that 1 + ::: + n
0
=
 (n0+1 + :::+n), that is C = 0, which makes C < MC hold for any level of budget
of the consortium. For instance, when n = 2, this occurs if 1 =  2. If instead
1 + ::: + n
0
is much larger than  (n0+1 + ::: + n), then C is much larger than
zero and the consortium buys only bundle A if its budget is small. Therefore, the more
diverse the libraries are in terms of their preferences for bundles of journals, the more
likely forming a consortium is to be benecial.
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4 Consortium of two libraries for exogenous budget
In this section, we analyze our model for the case of two libraries (i.e., n = 2) in order
to obtain more precise results by focusing on the correlation between the two libraries
preferences. We maintain Assumption 1 and, to reduce the number of cases to consider,
assume M1 =M2 M .
As in the previous section, we dene i  U iA   U iB for i = 1; 2 and, without loss of
generality, assume 1  j2j  0 (with at least one strict inequality). In words, Library
1 prefers bundle A to bundle B. If Library 2 also prefers bundle A, then Library 1 prefers
bundle A more than Library 2 does. If, conversely, Library 2 prefers bundle B, then
Library 1 prefers bundle A more than Library 2 prefers bundle B.
In order to simplify notation, let   2=1 2 [ 1; 1] and   1. Notice that  is a
measure of the correlation between the two librariespreferences. With this notation we
have
U1A   U1B = , U2A   U2B = , UCA   UCB = (1 + )( 0):
From Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, in the absence of the consortium, Library 1 buys
both bundles if and only if M > , Library 2 buys both bundles if and only if M > jj,
and the consortium buys both bundles if and only if M > (1 + )=2. Hence, we have:
Observation: If each library individually buys both bundles in the absence of the
consortium (i.e., if M > ), then the consortium buys both bundles, and thus the con-
sortium has no e¤ect.
From now on, we restrict attention to the case of M   and therefore Library 1
buys only bundle A in the absence of the consortium. We can further simplify notation
by considering a normalized budget M 0  M= 2 (0; 1] . Hence, in what follows, the
model has only two parameters: M 0 2 (0; 1] and  2 [ 1; 1]. From these remarks and
Proposition 1, we obtain the next proposition.
Proposition 2 (exogenous budget and correlation) Suppose Assumption 1 and M 0 
M= 2 (0; 1]. Then Library 1 buys only bundle A in the absence of the consortium.
Consider now the consortium of the two libraries.
(i) If M 0 > (1 + )=2, the consortium buys both bundles, which strictly increases the
librariesaggregate payo¤.
(ii) If M 0  (1 + )=2, the consortium buys bundle A only. This reduces the libraries
total payo¤ if M 0 > , but it does not a¤ect any librarys consumption nor its payo¤ if
M 0  .
Proof. It is omitted since it is straightforward from Lemma 1.
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Figure 1: The e¤ect of the consortium under Assumption 1 when the budget is exogenous
Figure 1 represents the sets of (;M 0) 2 [ 1; 1]  (0; 1] which satisfy the conditions
in Proposition 2(i) and (ii). The region denoted by + is such that M 0 > (1 + )=2; the
region denoted by is such that  < M 0  (1+ )=2; the region denoted by 0 is such that
M 0   < (1 + )=2. As a corollary, we have:
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumption 1 and M  . Consider the consortium of two li-
braries.
(i) In the case of perfectly negative correlation, the consortium always strictly increases
the librariestotal payo¤.
(ii) In the case of perfectly positive correlation, the consortium has no impact on the
librariestotal payo¤.
In order to provide an intuition, let us rst consider the extreme case of two identical
libraries. Then the consortium has no impact on the payment and the consumption of
each library. More generally, Proposition 2(ii) and Figure 1 show that the consortium
has no impact as long as the degree of positive correlation is strong enough with respect
to the budget, i.e. if M 0  . Thus, every library consumes only bundle A regardless of
whether or not the consortium is formed.
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Let us now consider the other extreme case of perfectly negative correlation (i.e.,
 =  1). Then, in the absence of the consortium, each library consumes only its preferred
bundle: Library 1 consumes only bundle A and Library 2 consumes only bundle B. On the
contrary, after the consortium is formed, it buys both bundles. This occurs because the
opposite preferences of the libraries make the market power of each publisher symmetric
under the consortium, and this creates a level-playing eld for the two publishers (without
a¤ecting the prot of any publisher).
Now let us consider the middle case of no correlation (i.e.,  = 0). Then, in the
absence of the consortium, Library 1 consumes only bundle A and Library 2 consumes
both bundles. In this case, the consortium increases (respectively, reduces) the aggregate
payo¤ of the libraries if its budget is large enough, i.e., if M 0 > 1=2 (respectively, small
enough, i.e., 1=2  M 0). If the budget is small, publisher A can export its residual
monopoly power from Library 1 to Library 2 in order to monopolize the market of the
consortium (and increase its prot). On the contrary, if the budget is large enough,
publisher As market power is not strong enough to monopolize the entire market of the
consortium and therefore the consortium buys both bundles (but the prot of publisher
A still increases).18
Another way to see that a lower  makes it more likely that a consortium is benecial
consists in noticing that in order to buy both bundles, the consortium needs to have a
budget larger than (1 + ). Therefore, if a consortium is formed to buy both bundles,
the required budget for the consortium increases with  2 [ 1; 1].
5 Endogenous budget
In this section, we relax the assumption of exogenously given budget and continue to
analyze the case of two libraries. We consider a single funding agency which allocates
funds either to each library separately or to the consortium of the two libraries. For this
purpose, we consider a timing in which Stage 0 in Section 2 is modied as follows:
 Stage 0: The funding agency decides whether it will allocate its funds to each
library separately or to the consortium and accordingly determines the budget of
each library or the budget of the consortium. The consortium is formed only if the
funding agency allocates its funds to the consortium.
We assume that the funding agency fully internalizes each librarys surplus from jour-
nal consumption but does not internalize at all the publisherspayo¤s. Therefore, the
18As the analysis of the three cases  =  1;  = 0;  = 1 suggests, under the consortium the prot of
A (the prot of B) is weakly higher (weakly smaller) than without the consortium, for any M 0  1 and
any  2 [ 1; 1].
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funding agencys objective is equal to the sum of the librariesutilities from journal con-
sumption minus the total payments to the publishers. We assume that at Stage 0, the
funding agency maximizes this objective.
Consider the market for library i = 1; 2; C, for instance, with U iA  U iB. According to
Lemma 1, any positive M i smaller than U iA U iB allows the library to consume bundle A
and any M i higher than U iA   U iB and lower than U iA + U iB allows the library to consume
both bundles.19 The payo¤ of the funding agency from this market is U iA M i in the rst
case and is U iA+U
i
B M i in the second case. Since the funding agency wants to minimize
the payment to the publishers given the consumption of library i, the Supremum of the
agencys payo¤ when M i is endogenous is given by U iA in the rst case, and by 2U
i
B in
the second case. Therefore, we have:
Lemma 2 Consider competition between two publishers in the market for a given library
when its budget is endogenously chosen by the funding agency. Assume UA  UB without
loss of generality. Then, the Supremum of the funding agencys payo¤ is max fUA; 2UBg :
Proof. It was given in the previous paragraph.
Let (S,D),20 for instance, represent the equilibrium allocation without the consortium
in which Library 1 consumes a single bundle and Library 2 consumes both bundles; (S,S),
(D,S) and (D,D) are similarly dened. As in the previous section, we use  U1A U1B > 0,
  U2A U2B

, and, without loss of generality, assume  2 [ 1; 1].
In the next lemma, we consider the case of   0 (positive correlation). We have:
Lemma 3 (positive correlation) Consider the case of endogenous budget with positive
correlation between the two librariespreferences (i.e.,  > 0):
(i) In the case of (S,S) or (D,D), building the consortium has no e¤ect on the bundle(s)
consumed and on the payo¤ of the funding agency.
(ii) In the case of (S,D) or (D,S), building the consortium changes the bundle(s)
consumed and strictly reduces the payo¤ of the funding agency.
Proof. It is given in the next paragraphs.
Consider rst the case of (S,S): U iA  2U iB holds for i = 1; 2. Therefore, UCA  2UCB is
satised. As a consequence, the funding agency induces the consortium to consume only
bundle A and thus building a consortium has no e¤ect on the bundle consumed and on
19As is written in Section 2, we assume that each publisher prefers selling its bundle at any positive
price to not selling it. If billing and providing access to the bundle cost c > 0 to a publisher such that
the lowest price at which a publisher wants to sell its bundle is c, we can extend our analysis to this case
at the cost of having an extra parameter c. Our results would hold as long as c is small enough.
20S refers to "single" and D refers to "duopoly".
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the agencys payo¤. The same logic applies to the case of (D,D), since then U iA < 2U
i
B
holds for i = 1; 2, which implies UCA < 2U
C
B .
Consider now for instance the case of (S,D). Note rst that the funding agency cannot
achieve this pattern of consumption through a consortium, since under the consortium
both libraries consume either bundle A only or both bundles. Moreover, given that the
consortium consumes bundle A (or bundles A and B), the funding agency can achieve the
same consumption pattern without the consortium at the same total payment. This implies
that under the consortium the funding agency chooses only between two alternatives
(S,S) and (D,D), a subset of the alternatives available without the consortium. Since
the funding agency nds it optimal to choose (S,D) in the absence of the consortium, a
revealed preference argument implies that (S,D) gives a higher payo¤ than (S,S) or (D,D).
Therefore building a consortium reduces the payo¤ of the funding agency.
Now we consider the case of  < 0 (negative correlation). In order to reduce the number
of cases, we assume that each library obtains the same total utility from consuming both
bundles:
Assumption 2: (U1A + U
1
B) =2 = (U
2
A + U
2
B) =2  U .
In the assumption, U represents the average utility from the two bundles. We can
normalize each utility U ij by dividing it by : let U
i0
j = U
i
j= for i = 1; 2; C and j = A;B.
Let U 0  U=. Hence, we have:
(U10A ; U
10
B ) = (U
0 + 1=2; U 0   1=2), (U20A ; U20B ) = (U 0   jj =2; U 0 + jj =2); 
UC0A ; U
C0
B

= (2U 0 + (1  jj)=2; 2U 0   (1  jj)=2):
U 0 must be larger than 1=2 since U10B > 0. Given this normalization, we have only two
parameters: U 0 > 1=2 and  2 [ 1; 0). We have:
Lemma 4 (negative correlation) Suppose that Assumption 2 holds, and consider the case
of endogenous budget with negative correlation between the two librariespreferences (i.e.,
 < 0).
(i) When U 0  3
2
holds. For any  < 0, (D;D) arises in the absence of the consortium.
Under the consortium, the libraries still consume both bundles but at strictly lower prices.
(ii) When 3=2 > U 0 > 1=2 holds, there are two cases:
(a) For  1=3   < 0: In the absence of the consortium, only (S,D) arises.
Under the consortium, the libraries consume both bundles if and only if U 0  3(1 jj)=4.
The consortium strictly increases the payo¤ of the funding agency if and
only if U 0 > (3  4 jj)=2.
(b) For  1   <  1=3: In the absence of the consortium, (S,D) arises if
U 0 > 3 jj =2 and (S,S) arises otherwise. Under the consortium, the libraries always
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consume both bundles. The consortium strictly increases the payo¤ of the funding agency
if and only if U 0 > 1
2
maxf3  4jj; 3 jj
2
g.
Proof. It is straightforward and hence is omitted.
This lemma reveals rst that, for any  < 0, whenever the average value of the journals
is large enough (i.e., U 0  3=2) such that (D,D) arises without a consortium, then the
consortium strictly increases the payo¤ of the funding agency. This is because building
the consortium does not a¤ect consumption but reduces the gap between the willingness
to pay for bundle A and the one for bundle B; this in turn increases competition between
the two publishers and allows the libraries to consume both bundles at a lower total price.
Precisely, without the consortium the total price paid is 1 + jj but the consortium pays
only 1  jj.
When the average value of the bundles is not large (i.e., 3=2 > U 0 > 1=2), either
(S,D) or (S,S) occurs without a consortium. To sharpen the intuition, let us consider
the two extreme cases of perfect negative correlation and no correlation. Under perfect
negative correlation, building a consortium always strictly increases the payo¤ of the
funding agency, which is the same as the aggregate payo¤ of the libraries. In this case,
only (S,S) arises in the absence of the consortium: Library 1 consumes only bundle A and
Library 2 consumes only bundle B. Then, building a consortium creates a level playing
eld between the two publishers such that the consortium can consume both bundles at
almost zero price. In contrast, in the extreme case of no correlation, only (S,D) occurs
without a consortium. Then, because of the revealed preference argument explained right
after Lemma 3, building a consortium always strictly reduces the payo¤ of the funding
agency. For the general case of negative correlation (i.e., 0 >  >  1), there exists a cut-
o¤ value of U 0  U= such that building a consortium strictly increases the payo¤ of the
funding agency for any U 0 above the threshold. This cut-o¤ strictly decreases with the
absolute degree of the negative correlation jj.
Figure 2 describes the consumption patterns in the absence of the consortium under
Assumption 2. Figure 3 shows the region (marked with +) in which building the consor-
tium strictly increases the payo¤ of the funding agency, the region (marked with 0) in
which building the consortium does not a¤ect it, and the region (marked with -) in which
building the consortium strictly reduces it. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 3 (endogenous budget and correlation) Consider the case of endogenous
budget.
(i) When the two librariespreferences are positively correlated (i.e.,   0), building a
consortium either has no e¤ect on the payo¤ of the funding agency, or strictly reduces it.
Under Assumption 2, the range of U 0  U= for which the consortium is harmful shrinks
with the degree of correlation such that it disappears for perfect positive correlation.
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Figure 2: The consumption patterns without a consortium under Assumption 2 when the
budget is endogenous
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Figure 3: The e¤ect of the consortium under Assumption 2 when the budget is endogenous
(ii) When the two librariespreferences are negatively correlated (i.e.,  < 0), under
Assumption 2, there exists a cut-o¤ value of U 0 such that building a consortium strictly
increases the payo¤ of the funding agency for any U 0 above the threshold. This cut-o¤
strictly decreases with the absolute degree of negative correlation jj such that the consor-
tium always increases the payo¤ of the funding agency for perfect negative correlation.
Proof. It is straightforward and hence is omitted.
Corollary 2 Consider the case of endogenous budget and suppose Assumption 2.
(i) In the case of perfectly negative correlation, building the consortium always strictly
increases the payo¤ of the funding agency.
(ii) In the case of perfectly positive correlation, building the consortium has no impact
on the payo¤ of the funding agency.
When we compare Figure 1 of exogenous budget and Figure 3 of endogenous budget,
it is remarkable that they share a number of features even if the parameter represented
on the vertical axis is di¤erent in the two gures. First, Corollary 1 and Corollary 2
have the identical predictions for the two extreme cases of perfect positive and perfect
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negative correlation. Second, given negative correlation, the parameter range for which
consortium is benecial increases with the absolute degree of correlation. Third, given
positive correlation, the parameter range for which consortium is harmful decreases with
the degree of correlation. The key di¤erence arises for the case of positive correlation:
while building a consortium is strictly benecial for a certain range of parameters when the
budget is exogenously given, it can never be strictly benecial in the case of endogenous
budget.
6 Commitment to consortium pricing and consor-
tium trap
In this section, we consider the case in which each publisher can commit to a price that
it will charge to a consortium before the funding agency decides whether or not to form
it. We consider two di¤erent scenarios. In the rst scenario, we allow the publishers
to commit only to the prices for the consortium, whereas in the second scenario, we
allow them to o¤er a menu of prices (i.e., prices for individual libraries and prices for the
consortium).
We nd that building a consortium is always benecial in the rst scenario. In contrast,
the outcome of the menu pricing is equivalent to that of the pricing game played after
the consortium is formed. In addition, we study a variation of the menu pricing game in
which the consortium cannot be formed with a high probability due to transaction costs
and nd that the outcome of this game is equivalent to that of the rst scenario.
We consider the model of exogenous budget in Section 4. There are two libraries, each
with an exogenous budget of M 0  M= > 0 where   1. Recall that   2=1 2
[ 1; 1] and U i0j  U ij=. We maintain Assumption 1.
6.1 Commitment to consortium pricing
In this subsection, we study the game with the following timing:
 Stage 0: Each publisher j (= A;B) simultaneously proposes a price PCj it will charge
if the consortium is formed.
 Stage 1: The funding agency decides whether to form a consortium or not.
 Stage 2: If the consortium is formed, it makes purchase decisions given (PCA ; PCB ).
Otherwise, each publisher j (= A;B) simultaneously proposes a price P ij to each
library i (= 1; 2) and then each library makes purchase decisions.
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Under the above timing, if the consortium is not formed, each library obtains the
payo¤ associated with the outcome described in Lemma 1, which becomes its reservation
utility. Let ij be the equilibrium prot that publisher j obtains from library i in the
absence of the consortium. We prove that no publisher realizes a prot strictly higher
than the one without the consortium. For instance, suppose that publisher A chooses
PCA > 
1
A + 
2
A , that is A charges a price strictly higher than its total prot without
the consortium. For bundle A to be sold to the consortium, the libraries joint payo¤
under the consortium should be higher than the one without it; that is, the aggregate
participation constraint (written with respect to the sum of the reservation utilities) must
be satised. However, PCA > 
1
A + 
2
A , together with the consortium budget constraint,
implies that if the consortium buys bundle A, then Bs prot is at most 2M 0 PCA , which
is strictly lower than Bs prot without the consortium. In the proof of Lemma 5, we
prove that by choosing PCB very high, P
C
B = 1 for instance, B can veto the consortium
formation since PCA (> 
1
A +
2
A ) and P
C
B =1 together violate the aggregate participation
constraint. In this way, B realizes a prot equal to 1B +
2
B , which is strictly higher than
2M
0   PCA . We have:
Lemma 5 Consider the game in which each publisher can commit to a price that it will
charge to the consortium before the funding agency decides to form it. Under Assumption
1, no publisher j (= A;B) can realize a prot strictly higher than its prot without the
consortium, 1j + 
2
j .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 5 suggests that there is an equilibrium in which each publisher j commits to
PCj = 
1
j + 
2
j and the consortium is always formed. In this equilibrium, the libraries
never lose from building a consortium.
Proposition 4 Consider the game in which each publisher can commit to a price that it
will charge to the consortium before it is formed by a funding agency. Under Assumption
1, there is an equilibrium in which each publisher j commits to PCj = 
1
j + 
2
j . In this
equilibrium,
(i) if M 0 > 1, the funding agency is indi¤erent between forming a consortium and not
forming it: each library consumes both bundles regardless of the consortium formation.
(ii) if M 0   (with  > 0), the funding agency is indi¤erent between forming a
consortium and not forming it: each library consumes only bundle A regardless of the
consortium formation.
(iii) if 1 M 0 > max f; 0g, the funding agency strictly gains from forming a consor-
tium. Without the consortium, Library 1 consumes only bundle A and Library 2 consumes
either both bundles or only bundle B. After building the consortium, each library consumes
both bundles.
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Proof. We just prove the existence of the equilibrium as the rest is straightforward.
The proof of Lemma 5 shows that given PCj = 
1
j + 
2
j , if publisher k(6= j) deviates
from PCk = 
1
k + 
2
k by increasing its price, then the libraries cannot a¤ord to buy both
bundles through the consortium, and rather than buying only bundle k, they prefer not
to form the consortium. Therefore, there is no protable deviation for publisher k.
The commitment to consortium pricing may correspond to a short-term situation. In
the short run, the publishers can commit to an aggregate payo¤ at least as large as the
payo¤ that the funding agency obtains under the status quo of no consortium in order
to induce it to form a consortium. Actually, in the equilibrium described in Proposition
4, the participation constraint is satised not only at the aggregate level but also at the
individual level: each library at least weakly obtains a higher payo¤under the consortium
than without the consortium. This suggests that Proposition 4 holds for the voluntary
consortium as well. However, in the long run, the publishers can charge prices which are
not constrained any more by the aggregate participation constraint as is shown in the
next subsection. Note also that it is the largest publisher (i.e., publisher A) which gains
from the consortium.
6.2 Menu pricing
In this subsection, we allow each publisher to o¤er a menu of prices (i.e., prices for
individual libraries and prices for the consortium) and study the game with the following
timing:
 Stage 0: Each publisher j (= A;B) simultaneously proposes a menu of prices
P 1j ; P
2
j ; P
C
j
	
which it will charge depending on whether a consortium is formed.
 Stage 1: The funding agency decides whether to form a consortium or not.
 Stage 2: The libraries or the consortium makes purchase decisions.
Let Cj be the equilibrium prot that publisher j obtains when the publishers compete
after the consortium is formed. The next proposition describes the unique equilibrium
outcome of the game with the above timing:
Proposition 5 Consider the game in which each publisher can commit to a menu of
prices for individual libraries and for the consortium before the funding agency decides
whether or not to form a consortium. Under Assumption 1, the unique equilibrium out-
come of this game is the same as that of the game in which the publishers o¤er prices
after the consortium is formed.
21
Proof. See Appendix A.
The reason why the menu pricing game leads to the outcome of the pricing game
played after the consortium is formed is the following. Given that the funding agency
maximizes the aggregate payo¤ of the libraries and can form the consortium for this
purpose, what matters is UCj in terms of its willingness to pay and M
C(= 2M 0) in terms
of its ability to pay. Then, regardless of whether publisher k(6= j) sells its bundle through
the individual libraries or the consortium, the total surplus to the libraries from bundle
k is UCk . Therefore, whenever publisher k tries to earn strictly more than 
C
k , publisher
j can o¤er P 1j = P
2
j =1 and PCj = Cj . Then, the funding agency must choose between
buying only bundle j and buying only bundle k, and prefers buying only bundle j at the
price of Cj .
Finally, we study the following variation of the menu pricing game. After the publishers
o¤er their prices, a transaction cost for building the consortium is realized. It is zero with
probability  > 0 and it is prohibitively high (and hence the consortium cannot be formed)
with probability 1   . The distribution of the transaction cost is common knowledge.
When  is close to zero, we have:
Proposition 6 Suppose Assumption 1. The outcome of the game with a commitment
to consortium pricing described in Proposition 4 is the same as that of the menu pricing
game if the probability of having a very high transaction cost is high enough: both the
consortium and each library face the same prices in both games.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 6 provides an additional justication to the outcome of Proposition 4.
When the probability of failing to build the consortium is high enough, no publisher can
threaten to shut down the trade through individual libraries and therefore the option to
trade through individual libraries determines a reservation utility for each library.
However, once the consortium is formed, it reveals that the transaction cost is not
high. Then, a publisher can threaten to charge a very high price to each library when the
consortium is not formed. Therefore, publisherspricing may not be constrained any more
by the reservation utility generated from the ability to purchase journals individually.
Then, those libraries with 1  M 0 > (1 + )=2 will continue to enjoy the benet of
consortium building whereas those with (1 + )=2  M 0 >  will experience a loss from
consortium building. In the latter case, the libraries are in a "consortium trap".
7 Extensions
In this section, in order to show the robustness of our main insight, we briey describe
the results from two extensions of the baseline model of exogenous budget: the detailed
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analysis of each extension is provided in Appendix B of Supporting Information.
7.1 Complements or substitutes
We assumed that the utility that a library obtains from the bundle of a publisher does not
depend on whether the library has access to the bundle of the other publisher. We can
relax this assumption and allow for the possibility that the two bundles are substitutes or
complements. More precisely, if library i (with i = 1; :::; n) buys both bundles, it gets a
gross utility of U iA+U
i
B + 
i, where i > 0 represents the case of complements and i < 0
represents the case of substitutes. We assume that the gross utility from consuming both
bundles is greater than the gross utility from a single bundle: U iA+U
i
B+
i > max fU iA; U iBg.
We modify Assumption 1 such that the budget constraint binds for any i and that the
substitution is not strong enough such that library i prefers buying both bundles to
buying a single one when M i > jij. Then, we can show that our results regarding when
a consortium increases or reduces the aggregate payo¤ of the libraries (i.e., Proposition
1) does not depend on whether the journals are complements or substitutes. This is
mainly because the equilibrium pricing in the market of library i (with i = 1; :::; n; C)
does not depend on (1; :::; n). For instance, when M i > jij, the equilibrium prices of
the duopoly are determined by the binding budget constraint P iA + P
i
B = M
i and the
indi¤erence condition U iA   P iA = U iB   P iB, which do not depend on i.
7.2 Three publishers
We can also extend our analysis to the case of three publishers. Suppose that there are
two libraries. Let U i(r) represent the surplus that library i (= 1; 2; C) obtains from its
r-th best (r = 1; 2; 3) bundle: the ranking is specic to i. In this case, Assumption 1 can
be extended in a straightforward way. We can show that building a consortium reduces
(respectively, increases) the aggregate payo¤of the libraries if their preferences are similar
(respectively, diverse) enough. Namely, when the consortium strongly prefers one bundle
over the other two bundles such that MC  UC(1)   UC(2) holds, each library is strictly
worse o¤ under the consortium, unless each library buys only the bundle preferred by
the consortium in its absence. By contrast, if the consortium has su¢ ciently balanced
preferences such that its utility from the two best bundles is not much larger than twice
the utility from the worst bundle (i.e., MC >
h
UC(1)   UC(3)
i
+
h
UC(2)   UC(3)
i
holds), each
library is strictly better o¤under the consortium, unless each library buys all three bundles
without the consortium.
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8 Conclusion
Our ndings show that what determines whether libraries gain or lose from forming a
consortium is not the mere size of the consortium but its composition, as is emphasized by
Dana (2012) in his theory of buyer groups. We nd that libraries with similar preferences
are likely to lose from building a consortium whereas libraries with diverse preferences
are likely to gain from building a consortium. We also nd a potential tension between
a short-term strategy and a long-term strategy as long as the former dictates forming
a library consortium among libraries with similar preferences to benet from quantity
discounts. This tension could lead to a consortium trap in that a short-term gain is
associated with a long-terms loss.
As our approach does not take into account the e¤ect that a consortium has on the
bargaining power and this force can make it desirable to build a consortium among libraries
with similar preferences, we need empirical studies about long-term e¤ects of consortia in
order to identify the major forces determining the success or failure of a consortium.21
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9 Appendix A
9.1 Proof of Lemma 5
(i) Consider M 0 > 1. Hence, each library consumes both bundles without a consortium.
If PCA is strictly higher than 
1
A + 
2
A and B chooses P
C
B = 1, then the aggregate
participation constraint reduces to
U1
0
A + U
10
B + U
20
A + U
20
B  U10A + U20A + 2M 0   PCA ;
which implies, from the binding budget constraint 2M 0 = 1A + 
2
A + 
1
B + 
2
B ,
U10B + U
20
B < 
1
B + 
2
B :
This can never be satised since it means that without a consortium, the libraries pay
to B more than the surplus they obtain from bundle B. The same kind of proof can be
applied to show that B cannot earn more than 1B + 
2
B .
(ii) Consider M 0   (with  > 0). Then it is clear that A cannot earn more than
1A +
2
A since 
1
A +
2
A = 2M
0. Publisher B cannot increase its prot above 1B +
2
B = 0
because A can induce the consortium to buy bundle A with PCA = 2M
0 as 2M 0  UC0A  
UC
0
B = 1 +  holds.
(iii) Consider 1  M 0 > max f; 0g. In the absence of a consortium, Library 1 con-
sumes only bundle A and Library 2 consumes only bundle B (if M 0    with  < 0) or
both bundles (if M 0 > jj). Consider the case in which Library 2 consumes only bundle
B: M 0    with  < 0. If PCA is greater than 1A + 2A = M 0 and B chooses PCB = 1,
then the aggregate participation constraint becomes
U10A + U
20
B  U10A + U20A + 2M 0   PCA ;
which implies
U20B   U20A < M 0:
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The latter inequality is equivalent to   < M 0, which cannot hold as we assumeM 0   .
The same kind of proof can be applied to show that B cannot earn more than 1B + 
2
B .
Consider now the case in which Library 2 consumes both bundles: M 0  jj. If PCA is
greater than 1A +
2
A and B chooses P
C
B =1, then the aggregate participation constraint
becomes
U10A + U
20
A + U
20
B  U10A + U20A + 2M 0   PCA ;
which implies
U20B < 
2
B ;
which can never be satised. The same kind of proof can be applied to show that B
cannot earn more than 1B + 
2
B . 
9.2 Proof of Proposition 5
We start by proving two lemmas:
Lemma 6 Suppose Assumption 1. Under menu pricing, in any equilibrium the prot of
each publisher j is not smaller than Cj .
Proof. If M 0  (1 + )=2, then CA = 2M 0 and CB = 0. In this case, the result is
obvious for publisher B. Publisher A can induce the funding agency to form a consortium
and buy bundle A by playing PCA = 2M
0 and p1A = p
2
A =1.
If M 0 > (1 + )=2, then we show that no equilibrium exists such that A < CA . We
distinguish the case in which the consortium is formed from the opposite case. Suppose
that the consortium is formed and that an equilibrium with A < CA exists. Then, we
must have B = 2M 0  A > CB .22 Consider the deviation of publisher A which consists
in setting PCA slightly higher than A (but smaller than 
C
A ) and p
1
A = p
2
A =1. After the
deviation, if the consortium is formed, it will buy bundle A since UCA   CA = UCB   CB
implies UCA   PCA > UCB   B. But it may occur that the consortium is not formed
after the deviation because each individual library buys bundle B, obtaining the total
payo¤ of UCB + 2M
0   p1B   p2B. This requires UCA   A  UCB   p1B   p2B, because if
UCA   A > UCB   p1B   p2B, then the consortium is formed, given PCA slightly higher than
A. The inequality UCA   A  UCB   p1B   p2B implies p1B + p2B < B. Then consider the
following deviation of A: PCA =1, p1A+p2A = A+"( 2M 0 p1B p2B). If the consortium
is formed, then it obtains a payo¤ of UCB  B+2M 0, whereas if it is not formed, then the
libraries obtain payo¤UCA  A "+UCB  p1B p2B+2M 0 by purchasing both bundles. The
22If A < CA and B = 2M
0   A = CB , then A + B < 2M 0. In this case, A has an incentive to
raise A at least by  > 0 small enough.
28
latter payo¤ is greater than UCB   B +2M 0 because UCA   A  " > 0 and p1B + p2B < B.
Hence A can increase its payo¤ above A.
Now suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which the consortium is not formed,
A < 
C
A and B = 2M
0   A > CB . Then consider the deviation of publisher A
such that p1A = p
2
A = 1 and PCA = CA . If the consortium is not formed, the libraries
can buy only bundle B, for a total price of B; hence they obtain a payo¤ smaller than
UCB + 2M
0   CB . On the other hand, if the consortium is formed, then it can obtain a
payo¤ of UCA + 2M
0   CA (which is equal to UCB + 2M 0   CB ) from buying bundle A.23
Hence A can increase its payo¤ above A. 
Lemma 7 Suppose Assumption 1. Under menu pricing, in no equilibrium publisher j
obtains a prot strictly higher than the prot Cj .
Proof. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which publisher j obtains a prot
strictly higher than the prot Cj . Since 
C
j + 
C
j = 2M
0, publisher k (6= j) obtains a
prot strictly lower than Cj , which contradicts Lemma 6. 
Proof of Proposition 5.
Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 imply that in any equilibrium each publisher j earns Cj .
One equilibrium of this game is such that PCA = 
C
A ; P
C
B = 
C
B , and p
1
A = p
2
A = p
1
B =
p2B = 1. Precisely, it is immediate to see that no protable deviation exists when
CA = 2M
0; CB = 0. If instead 
C
A < 2M
0, then no protable deviation for j exists
if the consortium is formed because deviation to PCj > 
C
j induces the consortium to
buy only bundle k (6= j).24 If publisher j wants to induce the funding agency not to
form a consortium, then it needs to o¤er a payo¤ higher than 1
2
(UCj + U
C
k + 2M
0), the
payo¤ the consortium can earn by purchasing bundle k at the price Ck . The inequality
UCj +2M
0 p1j p2j > 12(UCj +UCk +2M 0) is equivalent to p1j+p2j < 12(UCj  UCk +2M 0) = Cj ,
thus again no protable deviation exists. 
9.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Let pi;NCj be the equilibrium price and 
i;NC
j the equilibrium prot when there is no
consortium. When  is about zero, there exists an equilibrium with the following prole
of strategies
~PCj = 
1;NC
j + 
2;NC
j for j = A;B; ~p
i
j = p
i;NC
j for i = 1; 2; j = A;B:
where ~PCj can be any positive price if 
1;NC
j + 
2;NC
j = 0.
23The consortium buys both journals if PCB  CB .
24Obviously deviation to PCj < 
C
j is not protable since it reduces js prot.
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 Suppose that M  U2A   U2B, which implies that B earns 0 without a consortium.
Then ~PCA = 2M , ~P
C
B > 0; ~p
1
A =M , ~p
1
B > 0, ~p
2
A =M , ~p
2
B > 0. Regardless of whether
the consortium is formed or not, A earns the maximum feasible prot, and B can
do nothing to sell its bundle to C or to an individual library.
 Suppose that M > jU2A   U2Bj. Then ~PCA = M + 12(M + U2A   U2B), ~PCB = 12(M +
U2B   U2A), ~p1A =M , ~p1B > 0, ~p2A = 12(M + U2A   U2B), ~p2B = 12(M + U2B   U2A). When
the transaction cost is zero, the consortium gets formed since in this way it buys
both bundles, whereas without a consortium, Library 1 does not buy bundle B. Is
there any protable deviation for each publisher?
Since ~p1A, ~p
1
B, ~p
2
A, ~p
2
B are the equilibrium prices without a consortium, it follows
that there is no protable deviation if the consortium is not formed. Hence, if a
protable deviation exists for B, it must be such that the consortium is formed,
and pays for bundle B more than ~PCB . But in fact, this is impossible, because
UCA   ~PCA > UCB   ~PCB , and UCA   ~PCA > UCB   PCB for each PCB > ~PCB . Therefore if
B chooses PCB > ~P
C
B , then the consortium will not be formed or will be formed and
buy bundle A.
Likewise, if a protable deviation exist for A, it must be such that the consortium is
formed, and pays for bundle A more than ~PCA . Hence consider P
C
A >
~PCA and notice
that if the consortium is not formed, then the libraries in aggregate obtain a payo¤
of
U2B + 2M  
1
2
(M + U2B   U2A) + (U1A   p1A)x1A + (U2A   p2A)x2A + (U1B   p1B)x1B;
where xij = 1 if library i buys bundle j and x
i
j = 0 if library i does not buy it.
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Therefore it is necessary that
PCA  UCA +
1
2
(M + U2B   U2A)  U2B   (U1A   p1A)x1A   (U2A   p2A)x2A   (U1B   p1B)x1B:
Hence, As maximum prot is equal to


UCA +
1
2
(M + U2B   U2A)  U2B   U1Ax1A   U2Ax2A   (U1B   p1B)x1B

+ p1Ax
1
A+ p
2
Ax
2
A:
Notice that for  about zero, it is protable for A to set p1A = M , p
2
A =
1
2
(M +
U2B   U2A), which makes the prot from deviation equal to 2 (M   U2A   U2B) +M +
1
2
(M + U2B   U2A), which is smaller than M + 12(M + U2B   U2A) (by Assumption 1),
the prot in case of no deviation.
25Notice that x2B is set equal to 1 because given p
2
B =
1
2 (M + U
2
B   U2A), library 2 buys bundle B no
matter what p2A.
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 Now suppose that U2B > U2A and M  U2B  U2A. Then ~PCA =M , ~PCB =M , ~p1A =M ,
~p1B > 0, ~p
2
A > 0, ~p
2
B =M . Hence, if the transaction cost is zero, then the consortium
is formed and buys both bundles. As above, there is no protable deviation if the
consortium is not formed. In order for a protable deviation to exist for B, it has
to be such that the consortium is formed and buys bundle B for more than M , but
that cannot occur because UCA  M > UCB  M . In order for a protable deviation
to exist for A, it has to be such that the consortium is formed and buys A for more
than M . Hence, consider PCA > M and notice that if the consortium is not formed,
then libraries in aggregate obtain a payo¤ of
(U1A   p1A)x1A + (U1B   p1B)x1B + U2B +M:
Therefore it is necessary that
PCA  UCA   U2B +M   (U1A   p1A)x1A   (U1B   p1B)x1B:
Hence, As maximum prot is equal to

 
UCA   U2B +M   U1Ax1A   (U1B   p1B)x1B

+ p1Ax
1
A:
Notice that for  about zero, it is protable to set p1A =M , which makes the prot
from the deviation equal to  (U2A   U2B +M) + M , which is not larger than M
(since M  U2B   U2A), the prot in case of no deviation.
 Now suppose that M  U1A   U1B. Then ~PCA = 12(2M + UCA   UCB ), ~PCB = 12(2M +
UCB   UCA ), ~p1A = 12(M + U1A   U1B), ~p1B = 12(M + U2B   U2A), ~p2A = 12(M + U2A   U2B),
~p2B =
1
2
(M +U2B  U2A). As above, there is no protable deviation if the consortium
is not formed, and there is no protable deviation if it gets formed either, because
UCA   ~PCA = UCB   ~PCB .
31
Supporting Information
10 Appendix B: Extensions
10.1 Complements or Substitutes
We assume that if library i buys both bundles, then it gets a gross utility of U iA+U
i
B+ 
i,
where i > 0 represents the case of complements and i < 0 represents the case of
substitutes. We assume that the gross utility from consuming both bundles is greater than
the gross utility from a single bundle: U iA + U
i
B + 
i > max fU iA; U iBg. If a consortium is
formed by n libraries and the consortium buys both bundles, the consortium gets a gross
utility of UCA + U
C
B + 
C , where C  1 + :::+ n:
We modify our Assumption 1 as follows:
Assumption 1: M i < U iA + U
i
B   2
min0; i	 for i = 1; :::; n.
If the bundles are complements (i.e., i > 0), Assumption 1becomes M i < U iA + U
i
B.
Hence, when the budget constraint binds (P iA + P
i
B = M
i), the library gets a strictly
positive payo¤ from buying both bundles. If the bundles are substitutes (i.e., i < 0),
then Assumption 1becomesM i < U iA+U
i
B 2
i, and still, when the budget constraint
binds, the library gets a strictly positive payo¤ from buying both bundles.
Let us rst consider competition in the market for a given library i (= 1; :::; n; C): we
eliminate the superscript i. Then, under Assumption 1, Lemma 1 extends as follows.
Lemma 8 Consider competition between two publishers in the market for a given library.
Without loss of generality, we assume UA  UB. Suppose that the two bundles can be either
complements or substitutes, and UA + UB +  > UA. Under Assumption 1:
(i) if M  UA   UB, then publisher A charges PA = M , publisher B charges an
arbitrary PB > 0, and the library buys only bundle A;
(ii) if UA   UB < M < UA + UB   2jmin f0; g j, then the publishers charge PA =
1
2
(M + UA   UB), PB = 12(M + UB   UA), and the library buys both bundles.
Proof. The proof is straightforward and is omitted.
According to the lemma, the introduction of complements or substitutes does not
a¤ect equilibrium pricing under Assumption 1. If the budget is severely limited such
that M  UA   UB holds, then the librarys choice is between buying only bundle A
and buying only bundle B. Hence,  does not a¤ect the pricing. If the budget is not so
scarce such that UA   UB < M < UA + UB   2jmin f0; g j holds, the equilibrium prices
are determined by the binding budget constraint (PA + PB = M) and the indi¤erence
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condition between buying only bundle A and only bundle B (UA PA = UB PB). Hence,
the equilibrium pricing still does not depend on . However, in this case, the condition
that the library prefers buying both bundles to buying a single bundle should be met.
This is trivially met in the case of complements. However, in the case of substitutes
( < 0), the following inequality should hold
UA + UB   jj  Uj +M   Pj(= 1
2
(UA + UB +M)) for j = A;B;
which is equivalent to
UA + UB  M  2 jj :
Basically, the magnitude of the substitution should be limited, which is met under As-
sumption 1.
One consequence of Lemma 8 is that our results on when forming a consortium in-
creases the aggregate payo¤ of the libraries does not depend on whether the bundles are
complements or substitutes as long as U iA + U
i
B + 
i > max fU iA; U iBg and Assumption 1
are satised:
Proposition 7 (complements and substitutes) Suppose that for each library i, the two
bundles can be either complements (i > 0) or substitutes (i < 0). Moreover, suppose
that Assumption 1 is satised, that U iA + U
i
B + 
i > max fU iA; U iBg for i = 1; :::; n, and
that (without loss of generality) C  UCA   UCB  0. Then, whether the consortium
increases or reduces the aggregate payo¤s of the libraries does not depend on 1; :::; n: the
statement of Proposition 1 obtained when each i is zero still applies when 1; :::; n are
not all zero.
Proof. The proof is straightforward and is omitted.
Essentially, the consortium strictly increases (respectively, reduces) the aggregate pay-
o¤ of the libraries if it increases (respectively, reduces) the number of bundles consumed
for at least one library. The consortium can reduce the aggregate payo¤without a¤ecting
the number of bundles consumed by each library. This occurs when type A libraries con-
sume only bundle A and type B libraries consume only bundle B whereas the consortium
ends up buying only bundle A,. However, in this case,  does not matter since each library
consumes only one journal regardless of whether or not the consortium is formed.
10.2 Three publishers
In this subsection, we analyze an extension to three publishers (A;B;D) when there are
two libraries with exogenously given budget. Following Jeon and Menicucci (2006, 2011),
we introduce an intermediate stage between stage 0 and stage 1 in the timing described
in Section 2:
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 Stage 0: The funding agency decides whether to form a consortium or not.
 Stage 0.5: After observing the decision taken in Stage 0, each publisher simultane-
ously decides whether to be active or not in the market of each library i (i = 1; 2; C).
 Stage 1: After the decisions taken in Stage 0.5 are observed by all publishers and
the libraries (or the consortium), each publisher j active in market i simultaneously
chooses P ij > 0 for i = 1; 2 if the consortium is not formed (for i = C if the
consortium is formed).
 Stage 2: Each library (the consortium) decides the bundle(s) to buy.
If a publisher is not active in the market of library i, it does not o¤er any bundle to
the library and therefore the library cannot buy its bundle. As in Jeon and Menicucci
(2006, 2011), for equilibrium selection, we assume that at Stage 0.5, a publisher decides
not to be active in the market of library i if it expects to make zero prot in that market.
The assumption can be justied if a publisher should incur a very small but positive cost
of contracting a library. Without this assumption, the prices of the bundles that library
i buys may depend on the prices of the bundles library i does not buy, which creates
multiple equilibria.
Consider competition in the market for a given library i (= 1; 2; C). We eliminate the
superscript i and, without loss of generality, assume UA  UB  UD > 0. Then, from our
previous papers, we have
Lemma 9 (Jeon and Menicucci, 2006 and 2011) Consider competition between three
publishers in the market for a given library (or consortium), which starts from Stage 0.5.
Then, there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium active
publishers and prices are given by:
(i) if M  UA   UB, then only publisher A is active, and charges PA =M ;
(ii) if UA   UB < M  UA + UB   2UD, then only publishers A and B are active, and
charge PA = 12(M + UA   UB), PB = 12(M + UB   UA);
(iii) if M > UA +UB   2UD, then all three publishers are active, and each publisher j
(= A;B;D) charges Pj = Uj   13 max f0; UA + UB + UD  Mg.
As the budget increases, the number of active publishers increases. Note that for
M  UA + UB + UD, the budget is exhausted in the equilibrium.
In what follows, we compare the outcome under the consortium with the one without
the consortium. Let U i(r) represent the surplus that library i (= 1; 2; C) obtains from its
r-th best (r = 1; 2; 3) bundle: the ranking is specic to i. We assume:
Assumption 1: U iA + U
i
B + U
i
D M i > 0; for i = 1; 2:
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Assumption 1means that the budget constraint binds for each library and also implies
UC(1) + U
C
(2) + U
C
(3) MC . Arguing as in Proposition 1, we obtain
Proposition 8 Suppose there are three publishers, that Assumption 1 is satised, and
that (without loss of generality) UC(1) = U
C
A .
(i) If MC  UC(1)   UC(2), the consortium buys only bundle A. The consortium at least
weakly reduces the aggregate payo¤ of the libraries and strictly reduces it unless each library
buys only bundle A without the consortium.
(ii) If MC >
h
UC(1)   UC(3)
i
+
h
UC(2)   UC(3)
i
, the consortium buys all the three bundles.
The consortium at least weakly increases the aggregate payo¤ of the libraries and strictly
increases it unless each library buys all three bundles without the consortium.
Proof. It is straightforward from Lemma 9 and is omitted.
This result makes clear the e¤ect of consortium in two extreme cases: when the con-
sortium strongly prefers one bundle over the other two bundles, or the consortium has
su¢ ciently balanced preferences such that its utility from the two best bundles is not
too higher than twice the utility from the worst bundle. In the rst case, each library is
strictly worse o¤ under the consortium, unless each library buys only bundle A without
the consortium. In the second case, each library is strictly better o¤under the consortium,
unless each library buys all three bundles without the consortium.
The proposition does not consider the intermediate case in which UC(1) UC(2) < MC 
UC(1)+U
C
(2)  2UC(3), because under these inequalities the consortium buys its two preferred
bundles only, and then establishing the e¤ect on the aggregate payo¤ of the libraries
requires additional assumptions on preferences. Even for the two extreme cases, it is not
obvious to see when MC  UC(1)   UC(2) or MC >
h
UC(1)   UC(3)
i
+
h
UC(2)   UC(3)
i
holds. In
what follows, we introduce additional assumptions which allow us to make comparison in
a simple two-dimensional space of (;) as we have done for the case of two publishers
(see Figure 1). This requires us to consider a specic class of parameter values. More
precisely, we assume:
Assumption 3: M1 =M2 =M , U i(1)   U i(2) = U i(2)   U i(3); for i = 1; 2:
Assumptions 3 means that each library has the same budget and that the surplus gap
between two bundles of adjacent ranking is constant for each library. Concerning the
ranking of the bundles for Library 1, without loss of generality, we can assume U1(1) = U
1
A,
U1(2) = U
1
B, U
1
(3) = U
1
D. Regarding the ranking of the bundles for Library 2, we consider two
possibilities: either Library 2 has the same ranking as Library 1 (i.e., U2(1) = U
2
A, U
2
(2) = U
2
B,
U2(3) = U
2
D) or has the opposite ranking (i.e., U
2
(1) = U
2
D, U
2
(2) = U
2
B, U
2
(3) = U
2
A). Without
loss of generality, we can also assume U1(1)   U1(2)  U2(1)   U2(2). Let U1(1)   U1(2)   > 0.
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Then, we can write U2(1)  U2(2) = jj with jj 2 [0; 1], where  > 0 if both libraries have
the same ranking, and  < 0 if they have opposite ranking. Summarizing, we have:
U1A = U
1
B +; U
1
D = U
1
B  ;
U2A = U
2
B + ; U
2
D = U
2
B    if   0;
U2A = U
2
B   jj; U2D = U2B + jj if  < 0:
This implies also that the consortium has the same ranking as Library 1 regardless of the
sign and value of  2 [ 1; 1]: UC(1) = UCA , UC(2) = UCB , UC(3) = UCD .
In addition, we can normalize the budget by considering M 0 = M=. Then, from
Lemma 9, we have:
Corollary 3 Consider competition between three publishers in the market for a given
library (or consortium). Suppose Assumptions 1and 3.
(i) In the market for Library 1, the library buys only bundle A if M 0  1, only bundles
A and B if 1 < M 0  3, all bundles if M 0 > 3:
(ii) In the market for Library 2;
(a) when  > 0, the library buys only bundle A if M 0  , only bundles A and B if
 < M 0  3, all bundles if M 0 > 3;
(b) when  = 0, it buys all bundles;
(c) when  < 0, it buys only bundle D if M 0  jj, only bundles B and D if jj < M 0 
3 jj, all bundles if M 0 > 3 jj :
(iii) In the market for the library consortium, the consortium buys only bundle A if
M 0  (1 + )=2, only bundles A and B if (1 + )=2 < M 0  3(1 + )=2, all bundles if
M 0 > 3(1 + )=2:
Note rst that ifM 0 > 3, both libraries consume all three bundles regardless of whether
or not the consortium is formed. Therefore, we focus onM 0  3 for the comparison. How-
ever, when the consortium ends up consuming only two bundles, even under Assumptions
1and 3, many cases arise depending on the values of (M 0; ). In order to further reduce
the number of cases, we assume:
Assumption 4: U1(2) = U
2
(2); U
1
(1) < U
1
(2) + U
1
(3):
Under Assumption 3 and 4, the surplus that one library obtains from its rst-best
bundle (respectively, its second-best bundle) is higher than the surplus that the other
library obtains from its second-best bundle (respectively, its third-best bundle) and any
library obtains a higher surplus from consuming its second-best and third-best bundles
than from consuming its rst-best bundle only.
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Our results in this case are described in Figure 4, in which the lower bold line with a
positive slope describes the cuto¤values ofM 0 for the consortium to consume two bundles
instead of one and the upper bold line with a positive slope describes the cuto¤ values
of M 0 for the consortium to consume three bundles instead of two. Similarly, the two
horizontal dash lines describe the cuto¤ values for Library 1 and the two dash lines (with
a positive slope for  > 0 and with a negative slope for  < 0) describe the cuto¤ values
for Library 2. For each area generated by these lines, we indicate whether the consortium
increases or reduces or has no e¤ect on the aggregate payo¤ of the libraries by using + or
- or 0. Next proposition summarizes our results:
Proposition 9 (exogenous budget and correlation) Consider that the funding agency can
form a consortium of two libraries when three publishers compete. Suppose Assumption
1, 3, 4 and M 0  3.
(i) (opposite preferences) When  < 0,
(a) the intervals ofM 0 in which the consortium strictly increases the aggregate payo¤ of
the libraries expands with jj such that the consortium strictly increases it for any M 0  3
when jj = 1;
(b) the intervals of M 0 in which the consortium strictly decreases the aggregate payo¤
of the libraries shrinks with jj :
(ii) (similar preferences) When  > 0,
(a) the intervals of M 0 in which the consortium strictly increases the aggregate payo¤
of the libraries shrinks with  such that the consortium has no e¤ect on it for any M 0  3
when  = 1;
(b) the sum of the lengths of the intervals of M 0 in which the consortium strictly
decreases the aggregate payo¤ of the libraries increases with  up to  = 1=3 and then
decreases with  such that the consortium has no e¤ect on it for any M 0  3 when  = 1.
Proof. The proof is straightforward and is omitted.
We notice that the results of Figure 4 and Proposition 9 are remarkably similar to
those obtained from two publishers in Figure 1 and Proposition 2.
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Figure 4: E¤ect of consortium on the aggregate payo¤ of the libraries when three pub-
lishers compete
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